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# Failure modes, and what each one looks like

Passkey failures are quiet. The authentication endpoint returns a bare 401 with no body, the
registration endpoint returns a 500 with a generic error page, and the reason is only ever in
the server log at DEBUG. This chapter is a lookup table.

Run with the `trace` profile to see any of it:

```bash
./scripts/run.sh trace
```

## Every registration failure is an HTTP 500

This is worth stating on its own, because it is the first thing that confuses people.
`WebAuthnRegistrationFilter` has no error handling: whatever WebAuthn4J throws propagates out
of the filter and Boot's error page turns it into a 500. Three different mistakes, three
identical responses ([`pk-origin.txt`](../output/pk-origin.txt),
[`pk-user-verification.txt`](../output/pk-user-verification.txt),
[`pk-duplicate.txt`](../output/pk-duplicate.txt)):

```
$ POST /webauthn/register
HTTP 500
{"timestamp":"...","status":500,"error":"Internal Server Error","path":"/webauthn/register"}
```

Authentication is different. `WebAuthnAuthenticationProvider` catches everything:

```java
catch (RuntimeException ex) {
    throw new BadCredentialsException(ex.getMessage(), ex);
}
```

so the client gets a clean `401` with an empty body, and the cause is discarded before it
reaches any response the browser can see. Both behaviours mean the same thing: **read the
server log, not the HTTP response**.

## The table

| symptom | cause | where to look |
|---|---|---|
| `HTTP 400`, empty body, on `/webauthn/register/options` | nobody is logged in, or the session expired | `IllegalArgumentException: Authentication must be authenticated` |
| `HTTP 403` on any `/webauthn/**` POST | missing CSRF token — all five endpoints are state-changing POSTs | `CsrfFilter` at position 5 |
| `HTTP 500` on `/webauthn/register` | origin mismatch | `BadOriginException: The collectedClientData origin '...' doesn't match expected: ...` |
| `HTTP 500` on `/webauthn/register` | UV required, authenticator did not verify | `UserNotVerifiedException: ... UV flag in authenticatorData is not set` |
| `HTTP 500` on `/webauthn/register` | the credential id is already registered | `IllegalArgumentException: Credential with id ... already exists` |
| `HTTP 401`, empty body, on `/login/webauthn` | origin mismatch, bad signature, unknown credential id, or a null stored attestation object | `BadCredentialsException` wrapping the real cause |
| `navigator.credentials.create` never prompts | not a secure context — plain HTTP on anything but `localhost` | browser console, not the server |
| credentials vanish on restart | `MapUserCredentialRepository`, the default | [09 — Persistence](09-persistence.md) |
| `NullPointerException` during registration | an authenticator transport Spring does not know, e.g. `cable` | [spring-security#19366](https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-security/issues/19366) |
| WebAuthn breaks under Spring Session with Redis | creation options serialisation | [spring-security#16328](https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-security/issues/16328) |

## The origin mismatch, in full

This is the one that matters, because it is the phishing defence working. From
[`docs/output/pk-origin.txt`](../output/pk-origin.txt), with the client sending
`http://evil.localhost:8080` and the relying party configured for `http://localhost:8080`:

```
com.webauthn4j.verifier.exception.BadOriginException: The collectedClientData origin
    'http://evil.localhost:8080' doesn't match expected: http://localhost:8080
	at com.webauthn4j.verifier.OriginVerifierImpl.verify(OriginVerifierImpl.java:72)
	at com.webauthn4j.verifier.RegistrationDataVerifier.verify(RegistrationDataVerifier.java:171)
```

and the same mistake one ceremony later:

```
$ POST /login/webauthn (origin http://evil.localhost:8080)
HTTP 401
(empty body)
```

In a real browser this failure is not reachable: the browser writes the origin itself and the
credential is scoped to an rpId, so a phishing page never gets an assertion to send. The
software authenticator in this module can lie about its origin precisely so the server-side
half of the check can be watched.

## Debugging checklist

1. Is the rpId a domain, and does it match or registrably-suffix the origin's host?
2. Is the allowed origin the exact string, with scheme and port?
3. Is there a `WebAuthnRelyingPartyOperations` bean quietly overriding the DSL? ([02](02-minimum-configuration.md))
4. Is the request a POST with a CSRF token?
5. Is the session the same one that received the challenge? The default `PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptionsRepository` is `HttpSession`-backed, so a load balancer without sticky sessions breaks registration and nothing else.
6. Turn on `logging.level.com.webauthn4j: DEBUG` and read the actual exception.

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