#!/usr/bin/env bash # What an unauthenticated caller actually gets when exposure is "*" and the chain permits all. set -uo pipefail cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." OUT=docs/output/03-open-actuator-leak.txt B=http://localhost:8080/actuator { echo "### profiles: exposeall,open -- NO credentials are sent on any request below" echo echo "--- 1. /actuator/env does NOT leak values in Spring Boot 4 ---" echo "\$ curl -s $B/env/spring.datasource.password | jq .property" curl -s "$B/env/spring.datasource.password" | python3 -c 'import json,sys;print(json.dumps(json.load(sys.stdin)["property"],indent=2))' echo "\$ curl -s $B/env/acme.partner.credential | jq .property" curl -s "$B/env/acme.partner.credential" | python3 -c 'import json,sys;print(json.dumps(json.load(sys.stdin)["property"],indent=2))' echo echo " Note the second one. 'acme.partner.credential' matches none of the classic" echo " password/secret/token key patterns, and it is still masked. Masking is driven by" echo " management.endpoint.env.show-values, which defaults to 'never' - not by key names." echo echo "--- 2. /actuator/heapdump is NOT exposed by 'include: \"*\"' ---" echo "\$ curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' $B/heapdump" curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' "$B/heapdump" echo " management.endpoint.heapdump.access defaults to 'none'. So does shutdown." echo " They are the only two endpoints that do." echo echo "--- 3. /actuator/loggers: an unauthenticated WRITE ---" echo "\$ curl -s -X POST -d '{\"configuredLevel\":\"TRACE\"}' -H 'Content-Type: application/json' $B/loggers/org.springframework" curl -s -o /dev/null -w ' status=%{http_code}\n' -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"configuredLevel":"TRACE"}' "$B/loggers/org.springframework" echo "\$ curl -s $B/loggers/org.springframework" curl -s "$B/loggers/org.springframework" | python3 -m json.tool curl -s -o /dev/null -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"configuredLevel":null}' "$B/loggers/org.springframework" echo " (level reset). An attacker who can flip your root logger to TRACE has both a" echo " denial-of-service primitive and a way to get request bodies written to disk." echo echo "--- 4. /actuator/beans and /actuator/mappings: your whole application, described ---" echo "\$ curl -s $B/mappings | python3 -c 'count the URL patterns'" curl -s "$B/mappings" | python3 -c ' import json,sys d=json.load(sys.stdin) n=0 for ctx in d["contexts"].values(): for m in ctx["mappings"].get("dispatcherServlets",{}).values(): n+=len(m) print(f" {n} servlet mappings disclosed")' curl -s "$B/beans" | python3 -c ' import json,sys d=json.load(sys.stdin) n=sum(len(c["beans"]) for c in d["contexts"].values()) print(f" {n} beans disclosed, each with its type and dependencies")' } > "$OUT" 2>&1 echo "wrote $OUT"