Companion code for the follow-up article. The repository now holds two Maven
projects sharing one docs/ tree:
jwt-authentication/ the hand-written filter application (unchanged, moved)
oauth2-resource-server/ a resource server, a Keycloak compose, and a stub
issuer whose JWK Set can be mutated on command
The stub exists because Keycloak will not rotate a signing key at a chosen
second, report how many times its JWKS endpoint was fetched, or drop a key from
the published set on request - and the caching and rotation measurements need
all three. The Keycloak run confirms the same code path against a real issuer.
Findings captured under docs/output/, all from real runs:
* The default validator stack does not check aud. A token minted for another
service in the same realm is accepted.
* Spring Security builds its JWKSource with refreshAheadCache(false) and
rateLimited(false), overriding two of Nimbus's protective defaults, and
enables Nimbus caching only when NO Spring cache was supplied - so
supplying one removes the five-minute expiry.
* A key retired from the JWK Set stops being accepted at t+300s with the
default cache, and never with a Spring cache that has no TTL.
* 25 tokens carrying an unknown kid produce 25 JWKS fetches at the issuer,
through permitAll() endpoints included.
* A hyphenated client id in an authorities-claim-expression parses as
subtraction; the SpelEvaluationException is swallowed and logged at TRACE.
* A clientScopes key in a Keycloak realm import replaces the built-in scopes
rather than adding to them.
New docs chapters 12-18. README covers both projects. Existing docs and scripts
updated for the new paths; no docs/output/ file from the first article moved, so
links in the published article still resolve.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013f7f2XZXrQ6gW3RtZE187t
154 lines
5.4 KiB
Markdown
154 lines
5.4 KiB
Markdown
# 17 — Keycloak setup, and the three ways the realm import bites
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[← what an unknown kid costs](16-jwks-amplification.md) · [next: resource server checklist →](18-resource-server-checklist.md)
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```bash
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docker compose -f oauth2-resource-server/docker/compose.yaml up -d
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cd oauth2-resource-server && ./scripts/run-rs.sh keycloak,roles
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./scripts/keycloak-demo.sh
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```
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Transcript: [`rs-keycloak.txt`](output/rs-keycloak.txt). Keycloak **26.7.2**, released
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19 August 2026.
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The point of running against a real issuer is that nothing in the resource server changes.
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The application code is identical to the stub runs; one property differs:
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```yaml
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spring.security.oauth2.resourceserver.jwt.issuer-uri: http://localhost:8080/realms/demo
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```
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## Pin `KC_HOSTNAME`
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Keycloak derives the `iss` claim, and the `issuer` in its discovery document, from the
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request host unless you pin it. A token fetched through `localhost:8080` and the same token
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fetched through `keycloak:8080` from inside a Docker network carry **different issuers**,
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and [chapter 12](12-issuer-and-audience.md) explains why `JwtIssuerValidator` will refuse
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one of them.
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```yaml
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environment:
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KC_HOSTNAME: http://localhost:8080
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KC_HOSTNAME_STRICT: "false"
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```
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This is the fix for the majority of *“the token works in curl but not from the
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application”* reports. Both must agree with the value your resource servers are
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configured with, from wherever they run.
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## Keycloak does not add an `aud` for you
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An access token from a bare Keycloak client has no `aud` naming your resource server. Since
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[chapter 12](12-issuer-and-audience.md) argues you should be validating `aud`, you need a
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mapper:
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```json
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{
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"name": "reports-api-audience",
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"protocolMapper": "oidc-audience-mapper",
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"config": {
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"included.client.audience": "reports-api",
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"access.token.claim": "true"
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}
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}
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```
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Note `included.client.audience` for a client that exists in the realm, versus
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`included.custom.audience` for an arbitrary string. Using the former means the audience
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value is checked against a real client at configuration time.
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## A `clientScopes` key in the import replaces the built-ins
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This one cost a rebuild. A realm export/import that declares:
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```json
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"clientScopes": [ { "name": "reports:read", ... } ]
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```
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does not *add* that scope. It **replaces the entire set**, and Keycloak's built-in
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`profile`, `email`, `roles`, `acr`, `basic` and `web-origins` scopes are never created.
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Tokens from that realm then have:
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- no `realm_access` claim, because the `roles` scope is what adds it
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- no `preferred_username`, because the `profile` scope is what adds it
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which looks exactly like a broken authorities converter, and sends you to
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[chapter 14](14-authentication-converter.md) to debug something that is not wrong. Verified
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on 26.7.2 by listing the realm's client scopes through the admin API after import:
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```
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=== realm client scopes available ===
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offline_access
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reports:read
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```
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[`realm-demo.json`](../oauth2-resource-server/docker/realm-demo.json) therefore declares no
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`clientScopes` at all, and gets permissions across using realm roles and client roles
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instead.
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## Users need a name
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A user in a realm import with no `firstName` and `lastName` fails the password grant with a
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message that names nothing useful:
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```json
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{"error":"invalid_grant","error_description":"Account is not fully set up"}
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```
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The realm's default required actions want a complete profile. Supply the names, and
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`"requiredActions": []`.
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## Read the JWK Set before assuming it holds one key
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```
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keys published: 2
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kid=drdWA3YaK3PfH8uKORPsqYsf30mlkxtLKJdvYFzWqO4 alg=RSA-OAEP use=enc kty=RSA
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kid=B8LKu8nKy9b_CCTMqaZBdRH7dH1ASVjg5Do5hElKpQE alg=RS256 use=sig kty=RSA
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```
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A JWK Set contains keys you must not verify signatures with. Nimbus's
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`JWSVerificationKeySelector` filters on `use` and `alg` before matching `kid`, so this is
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handled — but if you are writing anything that reads a JWK Set yourself, filter on
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`use: "sig"` rather than taking `keys[0]`.
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## `typ` is a claim as well as a header
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A Keycloak access token has `typ: "JWT"` in the **JOSE header** and `typ: "Bearer"` in the
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**claim set**. `JwtTypeValidator` reads the header, so Keycloak passes the default type
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check. Nothing validates the claim. Do not write a validator that reads
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`jwt.getClaimAsString("typ")` expecting the header value.
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## `start-dev` resets everything
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Including the signing keys. Every restart is a new realm from the import, and a new `kid`.
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Convenient for the rotation work in [chapter 15](15-jwks-caching-and-rotation.md); a
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surprise if you were expecting yesterday's tokens to still verify.
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## What a real access token looks like here
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```json
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{
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"iss": "http://localhost:8080/realms/demo",
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"aud": "reports-api",
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"typ": "Bearer",
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"scope": "email profile",
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"preferred_username": "alice",
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"realm_access": { "roles": ["USER"] },
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"resource_access": { "reports-api": { "roles": ["reports-reader"] } }
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}
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```
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Which produces, with the converter from [chapter 14](14-authentication-converter.md):
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```
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"authorities": ["FACTOR_BEARER", "ROLE_USER", "ROLE_reports-reader", "SCOPE_email", "SCOPE_profile"]
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```
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There is no `client_id` claim, which is why
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`JwtValidators.createAtJwtValidator()` — which requires one — refuses Keycloak tokens
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unless reconfigured. Keycloak puts the client in `azp`.
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---
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[← what an unknown kid costs](16-jwks-amplification.md) · [next: resource server checklist →](18-resource-server-checklist.md)
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