asmhatre
4a8dab6739
Runnable companion for https://ankurm.com/spring-security-7-1-jwt-authentication-guide/ - login -> token issue -> OncePerRequestFilter -> SecurityContext, end to end - HS256 and RS256 variants (RS256 publishes a real JWKS endpoint) - the same API secured by the built-in oauth2ResourceServer().jwt(), for comparison - 11 documentation chapters under docs/, interlinked with the code - docs/output/ is real captured output, regenerated by scripts/run-all.sh - 13 passing tests pinning the 401-vs-403 contract and the CSRF failure Verified against Spring Boot 4.1.1, Spring Security 7.1.1, JDK 25.0.4.1.
146 lines
6.1 KiB
Markdown
146 lines
6.1 KiB
Markdown
# 04 — Why `permitAll()` still returns 403
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[← 401 vs 403](03-401-vs-403.md) · [next: HS256 vs RS256 →](05-hs256-vs-rs256.md)
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This is the single most reported "Spring Security is broken" bug, and it is not a bug.
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## The symptom
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```java
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.authorizeHttpRequests(auth -> auth
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.requestMatchers("/api/auth/login").permitAll()
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.anyRequest().authenticated())
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```
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```
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POST /api/auth/login
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Content-Type: application/json
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{"username":"alice","password":"alice-password"}
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HTTP 403
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WWW-Authenticate: Bearer
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```
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Reproduce it: `./scripts/run.sh hs256,csrfon` then `./scripts/csrf-demo.sh`. Captured in
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[`csrf-vs-permitall.txt`](output/csrf-vs-permitall.txt).
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Note the response body is empty and the header mentions `Bearer` — which sends people
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hunting for a token problem. There is no token problem.
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## The cause, in one number
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`CsrfFilter` is filter **5**. `AuthorizationFilter` — the only filter in the entire chain
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that has ever heard the word `permitAll` — is filter **12**.
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From [`csrf-trace.txt`](output/csrf-trace.txt), a real `TRACE` log of that exact request:
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```
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DEBUG FilterChainProxy : Securing POST /api/auth/login
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TRACE FilterChainProxy : Invoking DisableEncodeUrlFilter (1/12)
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TRACE FilterChainProxy : Invoking WebAsyncManagerIntegrationFilter (2/12)
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TRACE FilterChainProxy : Invoking SecurityContextHolderFilter (3/12)
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TRACE FilterChainProxy : Invoking HeaderWriterFilter (4/12)
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TRACE FilterChainProxy : Invoking CsrfFilter (5/12)
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TRACE CsrfTokenRequestHandler : Did not find a CSRF token in the [X-XSRF-TOKEN] request header
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TRACE CsrfTokenRequestHandler : Did not find a CSRF token in the [_csrf] request parameter
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DEBUG CsrfFilter : Invalid CSRF token found for http://localhost:8080/api/auth/login
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```
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The chain stops at 5 of 12. Filters 6 through 12 never run. `permitAll()` is a statement
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about filter 12, and filter 12 is not reached, so `permitAll()` is not a statement about
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this request at all.
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`CsrfFilter` throws an `AccessDeniedException` subtype — `MissingCsrfTokenException` when
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the repository had no stored token (the case above, with a fresh client), or
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`InvalidCsrfTokenException` when one existed and did not match. Both log the same
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"Invalid CSRF token found" line, so the message does not distinguish them. Neither
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reaches `ExceptionTranslationFilter`, which sits at position 11 — downstream of the
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filter that threw. `CsrfFilter` has its own `AccessDeniedHandler` and answers directly.
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```
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
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|----|----|----|----|----X .
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CsrfFilter AuthorizationFilter
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403, chain stops knows about permitAll()
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never invoked
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```
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## Why the header says `Bearer`
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`CsrfConfigurer` reuses the `AccessDeniedHandler` you configured under
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`exceptionHandling()`. Configure `BearerTokenAccessDeniedHandler` for your API — correct
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for real authorization failures — and a CSRF rejection is rendered by it too. You get a
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403 with `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer` and, because there is no OAuth 2.0 error in context,
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no `error=` parameter. A bare `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer` on a 403 is the fingerprint of a
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CSRF rejection, not a scope problem.
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## Three fixes, in order of preference
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### 1. Turn CSRF off — correct for a bearer-token API
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```java
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.csrf(csrf -> csrf.disable())
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.sessionManagement(session -> session.sessionCreationPolicy(SessionCreationPolicy.STATELESS))
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```
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CSRF exists because browsers attach **ambient credentials** — cookies, HTTP Basic,
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client certificates — to cross-origin requests automatically. A browser does not
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automatically attach an `Authorization: Bearer` header. Your JavaScript has to read the
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token out of memory and set it, and same-origin policy stops another site's script from
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doing that. No ambient credential, nothing to forge.
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The condition is strict, and both halves matter:
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- the token is **never** in a cookie, and
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- **no** cookie- or session-based authentication remains on any chain.
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If you store the JWT in a cookie "for convenience", it *is* an ambient credential, and
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you have re-created CSRF exactly. Disabling CSRF at that point is a real vulnerability.
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See [doc 07 — token storage](07-edge-cases.md#token-storage).
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### 2. Exempt the API, keep it for the browser chain
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For a mixed application — a server-rendered admin UI plus a token API:
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```java
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.csrf(csrf -> csrf.ignoringRequestMatchers("/api/**"))
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```
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Better still, split into two `SecurityFilterChain` beans with `securityMatcher()`, so the
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API chain has no `CsrfFilter` at all rather than one that is told to look away.
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### 3. Actually send the token
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If the client is a browser SPA that keeps a session:
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```java
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.csrf(csrf -> csrf.spa()) // Spring Security 7.0+
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```
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`spa()` bundles `CookieCsrfTokenRepository`, BREACH protection via
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`XorCsrfTokenRequestAttributeHandler`, and correct deferred-token loading. The client
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reads `XSRF-TOKEN` and echoes it in `X-XSRF-TOKEN`.
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Verified: the method does **not** exist in 6.4.7 or 6.5.1 and does exist in 7.0.0, so on
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6.x you configure those three pieces individually.
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## Related traps
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**Only unsafe methods break.** `CsrfFilter` ignores `GET`, `HEAD`, `OPTIONS`, `TRACE`.
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A `GET` on a `permitAll()` path works fine, which is why the failure looks intermittent
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and endpoint-specific. Step B of the [demo output](output/csrf-vs-permitall.txt) shows
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the same profile answering 200 to a `GET`.
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**A 403 with an empty body on `POST` only** is CSRF until proven otherwise.
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**`MockMvc` hides it.** `spring-security-test`'s `.with(csrf())` post-processor makes the
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test pass while production fails. `CsrfBreaksPermitAllTests` deliberately has both: one
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test asserting the 403 without it, one asserting the 200 with it.
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**CORS is not CSRF.** A preflight `OPTIONS` failing is a `CorsFilter` problem. Spring
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Security 7.1 added `PreFlightRequestFilter` CORS support ([gh-18926]); if preflight
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requests are being rejected, look there, not at CSRF.
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[gh-18926]: https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-security/issues/18926
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