Ankur Mhatre
4dc45d5e00
Companion code for the follow-up article. The repository now holds two Maven
projects sharing one docs/ tree:
jwt-authentication/ the hand-written filter application (unchanged, moved)
oauth2-resource-server/ a resource server, a Keycloak compose, and a stub
issuer whose JWK Set can be mutated on command
The stub exists because Keycloak will not rotate a signing key at a chosen
second, report how many times its JWKS endpoint was fetched, or drop a key from
the published set on request - and the caching and rotation measurements need
all three. The Keycloak run confirms the same code path against a real issuer.
Findings captured under docs/output/, all from real runs:
* The default validator stack does not check aud. A token minted for another
service in the same realm is accepted.
* Spring Security builds its JWKSource with refreshAheadCache(false) and
rateLimited(false), overriding two of Nimbus's protective defaults, and
enables Nimbus caching only when NO Spring cache was supplied - so
supplying one removes the five-minute expiry.
* A key retired from the JWK Set stops being accepted at t+300s with the
default cache, and never with a Spring cache that has no TTL.
* 25 tokens carrying an unknown kid produce 25 JWKS fetches at the issuer,
through permitAll() endpoints included.
* A hyphenated client id in an authorities-claim-expression parses as
subtraction; the SpelEvaluationException is swallowed and logged at TRACE.
* A clientScopes key in a Keycloak realm import replaces the built-in scopes
rather than adding to them.
New docs chapters 12-18. README covers both projects. Existing docs and scripts
updated for the new paths; no docs/output/ file from the first article moved, so
links in the published article still resolve.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013f7f2XZXrQ6gW3RtZE187t
51 lines
1.9 KiB
Bash
Executable File
51 lines
1.9 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# Shared helpers. Sourced, not run.
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RS="${RS:-http://localhost:8081}"
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STUB="${STUB:-http://localhost:9000}"
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KC="${KC:-http://localhost:8080}"
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hr() { printf '%s\n' "--------------------------------------------------------------------------"; }
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head1(){ hr; printf ' %s\n' "$1"; hr; }
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# Prints status, the RFC 6750 challenge header, and the body. The WWW-Authenticate header is
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# the only place a claim-validation failure explains itself, so it is never omitted here.
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call() {
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local label="$1" url="$2" token="${3:-}"
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printf '\n$ %s\n' "$label"
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local args=(-s -o /tmp/.body -D /tmp/.hdr -w '%{http_code}')
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[ -n "$token" ] && args+=(-H "Authorization: Bearer $token")
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local code
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code=$(curl "${args[@]}" "$url")
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printf 'HTTP %s\n' "$code"
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grep -i '^www-authenticate:' /tmp/.hdr | sed 's/\r$//' || true
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if [ -s /tmp/.body ]; then
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python3 -m json.tool < /tmp/.body 2>/dev/null || cat /tmp/.body
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echo
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fi
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}
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stub_token() { curl -s -X POST "$STUB/token?$1"; }
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stub_state() { curl -s "$STUB/admin/state" | python3 -m json.tool; }
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stub_fetches() { curl -s "$STUB/admin/state" | python3 -c 'import json,sys;print(json.load(sys.stdin)["jwksFetches"])'; }
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kc_token() {
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curl -s -X POST "$KC/realms/demo/protocol/openid-connect/token" \
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-d grant_type=password -d client_id=demo-client -d client_secret=demo-secret \
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-d "username=$1" -d "password=$2" \
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| python3 -c 'import json,sys;print(json.load(sys.stdin).get("access_token",""))'
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}
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claims() {
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python3 - "$1" <<'PY'
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import sys, base64, json
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tok = sys.argv[1]
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h, p, _ = tok.split('.')
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pad = lambda s: s + '=' * (-len(s) % 4)
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print(" header:", json.dumps(json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(pad(h)))))
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c = json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(pad(p)))
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for k in ("iss", "aud", "typ", "scope", "preferred_username", "realm_access", "resource_access"):
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if k in c:
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print(" %-18s %s" % (k, json.dumps(c[k])))
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PY
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}
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