Ankur Mhatre
4dc45d5e00
Companion code for the follow-up article. The repository now holds two Maven
projects sharing one docs/ tree:
jwt-authentication/ the hand-written filter application (unchanged, moved)
oauth2-resource-server/ a resource server, a Keycloak compose, and a stub
issuer whose JWK Set can be mutated on command
The stub exists because Keycloak will not rotate a signing key at a chosen
second, report how many times its JWKS endpoint was fetched, or drop a key from
the published set on request - and the caching and rotation measurements need
all three. The Keycloak run confirms the same code path against a real issuer.
Findings captured under docs/output/, all from real runs:
* The default validator stack does not check aud. A token minted for another
service in the same realm is accepted.
* Spring Security builds its JWKSource with refreshAheadCache(false) and
rateLimited(false), overriding two of Nimbus's protective defaults, and
enables Nimbus caching only when NO Spring cache was supplied - so
supplying one removes the five-minute expiry.
* A key retired from the JWK Set stops being accepted at t+300s with the
default cache, and never with a Spring cache that has no TTL.
* 25 tokens carrying an unknown kid produce 25 JWKS fetches at the issuer,
through permitAll() endpoints included.
* A hyphenated client id in an authorities-claim-expression parses as
subtraction; the SpelEvaluationException is swallowed and logged at TRACE.
* A clientScopes key in a Keycloak realm import replaces the built-in scopes
rather than adding to them.
New docs chapters 12-18. README covers both projects. Existing docs and scripts
updated for the new paths; no docs/output/ file from the first article moved, so
links in the published article still resolve.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013f7f2XZXrQ6gW3RtZE187t
113 lines
4.9 KiB
Bash
Executable File
113 lines
4.9 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# Regenerates ../docs/output/curl-transcript-hs256.txt against a running instance.
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# Usage: ./scripts/curl-transcript.sh [base-url]
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set -u
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BASE="${1:-http://localhost:8080}"
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hr() { printf '\n%s\n' "--------------------------------------------------------------------------"; }
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step(){ hr; printf '# %s\n\n' "$1"; }
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# Print status line, the security-relevant headers, and the body.
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show() {
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local out
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out=$(curl -sS -D /tmp/.h -o /tmp/.b -w '%{http_code}' "$@")
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printf 'HTTP %s\n' "$out"
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grep -iE '^(www-authenticate|content-type|set-cookie):' /tmp/.h | sed 's/\r$//'
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if [ -s /tmp/.b ]; then
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python3 -m json.tool < /tmp/.b 2>/dev/null || cat /tmp/.b
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echo
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fi
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}
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jwt_part() { # $1=token $2=0|1 -> pretty-print header or payload
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echo "$1" | cut -d. -f$(( $2 + 1 )) \
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| tr '_-' '/+' | sed 's/$/==/' | base64 -d 2>/dev/null \
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| python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null
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}
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echo "=========================================================================="
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echo " jwt-auth-demo - curl transcript"
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echo " target : $BASE"
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echo "=========================================================================="
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step "1. Public endpoint, no token. permitAll() means the filter chain lets it through."
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show "$BASE/api/public/ping"
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step "2. Protected endpoint, no token. 401 - we do not know who you are."
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show "$BASE/api/me"
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step "3. Wrong password. Still 401, and the body says nothing about which half was wrong."
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show -X POST "$BASE/api/auth/login" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
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-d '{"username":"alice","password":"wrong-password"}'
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step "4. Locked account. 401 with the identical body - no account-state oracle."
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show -X POST "$BASE/api/auth/login" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
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-d '{"username":"locked","password":"locked-password"}'
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step "5. Login as alice (ROLE_USER, SCOPE_profile:read)."
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show -X POST "$BASE/api/auth/login" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
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-d '{"username":"alice","password":"alice-password"}'
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ALICE=$(python3 -c "import json;print(json.load(open('/tmp/.b'))['accessToken'])")
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ALICE_REFRESH=$(python3 -c "import json;print(json.load(open('/tmp/.b'))['refreshToken'])")
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step "6. What is actually inside that token (base64url decode - no signature check)."
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echo "--- JOSE header ---"
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jwt_part "$ALICE" 0
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echo "--- claims ---"
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jwt_part "$ALICE" 1
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step "7. The same protected endpoint, now with the token. 200."
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show "$BASE/api/me" -H "Authorization: Bearer $ALICE"
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step "8. alice hits an ADMIN endpoint. 403, not 401 - we know who she is, she may not."
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show "$BASE/api/admin/stats" -H "Authorization: Bearer $ALICE"
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step "9. Same request with a scope-based rule (@PreAuthorize). Also 403."
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show "$BASE/api/reports" -H "Authorization: Bearer $ALICE"
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step "10. Login as root and repeat. 200."
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show -X POST "$BASE/api/auth/login" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
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-d '{"username":"root","password":"root-password"}'
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ROOT=$(python3 -c "import json;print(json.load(open('/tmp/.b'))['accessToken'])")
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show "$BASE/api/admin/stats" -H "Authorization: Bearer $ROOT"
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step "11. Tampered payload, original signature. 401 invalid_token."
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HDR=$(echo "$ALICE" | cut -d. -f1); SIG=$(echo "$ALICE" | cut -d. -f3)
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FORGED_PAYLOAD=$(echo "$ALICE" | cut -d. -f2 | tr '_-' '/+' | sed 's/$/==/' | base64 -d 2>/dev/null \
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| sed 's/"roles":\["USER"\]/"roles":["ADMIN"]/' | base64 -w0 | tr '/+' '_-' | tr -d '=')
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show "$BASE/api/admin/stats" -H "Authorization: Bearer $HDR.$FORGED_PAYLOAD.$SIG"
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step "12. Garbage where a token should be. 401, and note it is NOT 400."
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show "$BASE/api/me" -H "Authorization: Bearer not-a-jwt"
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step "13. Authorization header with no Bearer scheme. The resolver sees no token at all,\n# so this is an authorization failure, not a token failure - note the bare realm."
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show "$BASE/api/me" -H "Authorization: $ALICE"
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step "14. A refresh token presented as an access token. 401 - the token_type claim."
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show "$BASE/api/me" -H "Authorization: Bearer $ALICE_REFRESH"
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step "15. Refresh with rotation. New access token, new refresh token."
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show -X POST "$BASE/api/auth/refresh" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
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-d "{\"refreshToken\":\"$ALICE_REFRESH\"}"
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ALICE2=$(python3 -c "import json;print(json.load(open('/tmp/.b'))['accessToken'])")
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step "16. Replay the spent refresh token. 401 - rotation makes replay detectable."
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show -X POST "$BASE/api/auth/refresh" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
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-d "{\"refreshToken\":\"$ALICE_REFRESH\"}"
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step "17. Logout revokes the presented access token by its jti."
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show -X POST "$BASE/api/auth/logout" -H "Authorization: Bearer $ALICE2"
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show "$BASE/api/auth/revocations" -H "Authorization: Bearer $ROOT"
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step "18. The revoked token, still cryptographically valid, is now refused."
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show "$BASE/api/me" -H "Authorization: Bearer $ALICE2"
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step "19. The real filter order, read from FilterChainProxy at runtime."
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show "$BASE/api/public/filters"
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step "20. SecurityContext across a thread boundary."
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show "$BASE/api/async-demo" -H "Authorization: Bearer $ROOT"
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hr
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echo "# end of transcript"
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