Ankur Mhatre
4dc45d5e00
Companion code for the follow-up article. The repository now holds two Maven
projects sharing one docs/ tree:
jwt-authentication/ the hand-written filter application (unchanged, moved)
oauth2-resource-server/ a resource server, a Keycloak compose, and a stub
issuer whose JWK Set can be mutated on command
The stub exists because Keycloak will not rotate a signing key at a chosen
second, report how many times its JWKS endpoint was fetched, or drop a key from
the published set on request - and the caching and rotation measurements need
all three. The Keycloak run confirms the same code path against a real issuer.
Findings captured under docs/output/, all from real runs:
* The default validator stack does not check aud. A token minted for another
service in the same realm is accepted.
* Spring Security builds its JWKSource with refreshAheadCache(false) and
rateLimited(false), overriding two of Nimbus's protective defaults, and
enables Nimbus caching only when NO Spring cache was supplied - so
supplying one removes the five-minute expiry.
* A key retired from the JWK Set stops being accepted at t+300s with the
default cache, and never with a Spring cache that has no TTL.
* 25 tokens carrying an unknown kid produce 25 JWKS fetches at the issuer,
through permitAll() endpoints included.
* A hyphenated client id in an authorities-claim-expression parses as
subtraction; the SpelEvaluationException is swallowed and logged at TRACE.
* A clientScopes key in a Keycloak realm import replaces the built-in scopes
rather than adding to them.
New docs chapters 12-18. README covers both projects. Existing docs and scripts
updated for the new paths; no docs/output/ file from the first article moved, so
links in the published article still resolve.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013f7f2XZXrQ6gW3RtZE187t
33 lines
1.6 KiB
Bash
Executable File
33 lines
1.6 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# Requires: --spring.profiles.active=hs256,shortlived (2-second access tokens)
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set -u
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BASE="${1:-http://localhost:8080}"
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show() {
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local out; out=$(curl -sS -D /tmp/.h -o /tmp/.b -w '%{http_code}' "$@")
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printf 'HTTP %s\n' "$out"
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grep -iE '^www-authenticate:' /tmp/.h | sed 's/\r$//'
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[ -s /tmp/.b ] && { python3 -m json.tool < /tmp/.b 2>/dev/null | head -6 || cat /tmp/.b; }
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echo
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}
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hr(){ printf '\n%s\n' "--------------------------------------------------------------------------"; }
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echo "=========================================================================="
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echo " jwt-auth-demo - token expiry and the 60-second clock skew"
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echo " profiles: hs256,shortlived (access-token-ttl = 2s)"
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echo "=========================================================================="
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TOK=$(curl -sS -X POST "$BASE/api/auth/login" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
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-d '{"username":"alice","password":"alice-password"}' | python3 -c 'import json,sys;print(json.load(sys.stdin)["accessToken"])')
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hr; echo "# T+0s - fresh token"; echo; show "$BASE/api/me" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOK"
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hr; echo "# T+5s - exp has passed, but JwtTimestampValidator allows 60s of clock skew"
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echo "# by default, so the token is STILL accepted. This surprises people"
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echo "# who write a test that sleeps past exp and expects a 401."
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echo; sleep 5; show "$BASE/api/me" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOK"
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hr; echo "# T+65s - past exp + the 60s skew window. Now it is refused."
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echo; sleep 60; show "$BASE/api/me" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOK"
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hr; echo "# end"
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