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spring-security-demo/context-propagation/docs/06-scheduled-tasks.md
asmhatre 5e9e7f1b12 Split into per-article modules and add the method-security module
Moves the existing virtual-thread/context-propagation project into
context-propagation/ and adds method-security/ for the Spring Security 7
method-security article: nine runnable demos, fourteen assertions, and every
transcript the article quotes, regenerated by scripts/run-all.sh.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RSrsDSRKVsY588yFiMJMo9
2026-08-25 02:01:29 +00:00

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# 6. DelegatingSecurityContextTaskScheduler and the synthetic system identity
[&larr; Prev: Reactive context](05-reactive-context.md) | [Next: Servlet filter persistence &rarr;](07-servlet-filter-persistence.md)
Every previous chapter is about carrying *somebody's* context across a thread or scheduler
boundary. `Demo6ScheduledSystemIdentity.java` is about the case where that framing breaks
down: a `@Scheduled` cron trigger has no caller, so there is no `Authentication` anywhere to
propagate in the first place. Full output in [`docs/output/demo6.txt`](output/demo6.txt).
## What `DelegatingSecurityContextTaskScheduler` actually captures
Before writing this demo, the class's bytecode was read directly (not assumed from the
Javadoc) to answer one question precisely: does the single-argument constructor capture
`SecurityContextHolder.getContext()` once, when the wrapper is built, or fresh, every time
`schedule(...)` is called? The constructor itself stores a `null` `SecurityContext` field;
`wrap(Runnable)` -- called synchronously from inside every `schedule*` method -- passes that
`null` to `DelegatingSecurityContextRunnable.create(...)`, which resolves `null` to
`SecurityContextHolder.getContext()` at that exact call site. So the capture happens **per
call to `schedule()`**, on whatever thread makes that call, not once at wrapper-construction
time. Scenario B in the demo proves it against the real class rather than the disassembly:
```
B1) first schedule() call, caller context = registration-thread-X: authenticated as registration-thread-X
B2) second schedule() call on the SAME wrapper, caller context changed to registration-thread-Y: authenticated as registration-thread-Y
```
Two `schedule()` calls on the identical `DelegatingSecurityContextTaskScheduler` instance,
with the calling thread's `SecurityContextHolder` changed in between, capture two different
contexts independently. In a real Spring app, `ScheduledTaskRegistrar.afterPropertiesSet()`
calls `schedule()` once per `@Scheduled` method, all during application context refresh on the
startup thread -- which is almost always running with **no** `SecurityContext` at all.
Scenario A is that realistic case:
```
A) schedule() called with NO context present on the caller thread: NO AUTHENTICATION (lost)
```
## Why the post's `createSystemContext()` pattern exists
There is no "the user" to recover here, so the fix in the post's `ScheduledTasks` example
doesn't try to propagate anything -- it constructs a brand-new `SecurityContext` from scratch,
inside the `@Scheduled` method body, with a narrowly scoped synthetic principal:
```java
private SecurityContext createSystemContext() {
Authentication systemAuth = new UsernamePasswordAuthenticationToken(
"SYSTEM", null, AuthorityUtils.createAuthorityList("ROLE_SYSTEM")
);
SecurityContext context = SecurityContextHolder.createEmptyContext();
context.setAuthentication(systemAuth);
return context;
}
```
Scenario C runs exactly this pattern and confirms the result end to end:
```
C) task body sets its own systemContext(), ignoring anything the scheduler wrapper captured: SYSTEM with authorities [ROLE_SYSTEM]
```
`ROLE_SYSTEM` here, not an admin role borrowed from somewhere else in the app -- the point of
minting a dedicated identity is that a bug in the scheduled task is bounded by what
`ROLE_SYSTEM` can do, not by whatever the broadest role in the system happens to be.
## Edge case: the synthetic principal isn't "anonymous" to Spring Security
It's tempting to assume a made-up `SYSTEM` principal with no credentials is somehow a special
or unauthenticated case. It isn't -- `AuthenticationTrustResolver` has no concept of "system"
at all, and treats it as a completely ordinary authenticated principal:
```
EDGE) AuthenticationTrustResolver.isAnonymous(systemContext()): false
```
That matters anywhere the app has authorization rules keyed on `isAnonymous()` or
`isRememberMe()` (an `.anonymous()` matcher in a `SecurityFilterChain`, for instance) --
`createSystemContext()`'s output will not match those rules, which is usually what you want,
but is worth confirming rather than assuming for a security-relevant identity.
## The Boot 4.1 virtual-thread footnote
`spring.threads.virtual.enabled=true` also swaps the scheduler backing `@Scheduled` for a
`SimpleAsyncTaskScheduler` running virtual threads, the same substitution
[Chapter 2](02-async-virtual-threads.md) covers for `@Async`. The "fresh thread every time, no
pooled-worker staleness" reasoning from Chapters 1&ndash;2 applies here too, but it changes
nothing about this chapter's actual point: there is still no per-invocation user identity for
any thread model to inherit, because there was never a user in the first place.